Creating an military organization capable of finding its niche among interagency partners in an area of responsibility as diverse as the African continent -- with its deep and varied political and cultural nuances -- is no easy task. And while input from academia is essential, I would have hoped for a more thoughtful set of recommendations from the scholars at the University of Southern California than those contained in the March 2008 Policy Briefing Pamphlet.
For those who missed them, they boil down to:
1) Define the mission -- and how PD fits in.
2) Establish roles, responsibilities, and chain of command.
3) Talk to others about how to get things done in Africa.
4) Know your audience -- and by the way, listening helps ;-)
Perhaps the comments coming out of the February 8 panel discussion and March 18 discussion in Washington are reflective of the fledgling state of the new combatant command. If this is the case, and the process of establishing an organizational framework for AFRICOM has not moved beyond a point where these recommendations are self-evident to the AFRICOM team, there may be cause for concern.
While USC's recommendations try to focus on "public diplomacy," I find a few pervasive themes unsettling:
1) They raise issues concerning the nature of U.S. engagement on the African continent writ-large;
2) They advocate listening to African concerns but noticably leave Africans out of the list of those who should be consulted as public diplomacy ideas are developed;
3) They seem to confuse traditional defense functions pertaining to strategic communication and information operations (as deliniated by the definitions provided by the military in Joint Pub 3-13) with "military-based public diplomacy."
And while the military conduct of traditional public diplomacy would cause this author concern, as I understand it AFRICOM seeks to place more emphasis on Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (also as defined in DoD Doctrine) because it recognizes that it, too, must contribute to U.S. Government strategic communication efforts as it works with partner nations to help ensure peace, stability, and prosperity across Africa.
That DoD is not responsible for leading these efforts is clear. The language in DoD Joint Pub 3-13, "Information Operations," clearly establishes a supporting role for the U.S. military:
"DOD contributes to PD, which includes those overt international information activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. When approved, PSYOP assets may be employed in support of DSPD [Defense Support for Public Diplomacy] as part of security cooperation initiatives or in support of US embassy PD [public diplomacy] programs. Much of the operational level IO [information operations] activity conducted in any theater will be directly linked to PD objectives. DSPD requires coordination with both the interagency and among DOD components." [Emphasis added.]
Supporting tables appearing later in the coordination portion of the document further bolster this notion of a supporting role for DoD. And while DoD a) will always favor action over inaction, and b) is better equipped to accomplish its "supporting role" than those tasked with the all of other elements of strategic communication combined, these are issues for another discussion...
Indeed, the Department of Defense needs to decide how it will support public diplomacy, and how this support fits into broader U.S. Government strategic communication efforts. Strategic communication planning should be incorporated into the initial phases of crafting a campaign plan for AFRICOM. Overarching guidance would empower those working within each region/country to forge operational strategic communications plans, incorporating elements of defense support to public diplomacy and refining strategic guidance to best fit conditions on the ground. That DoD recognizes the impact of its operations on how America is perceived abroad and wants to ensure that its efforts align properly with those of its interagency partners is an encouraging first step.
So, while those guiding the coordination of interagency strategic communication efforts for Africa -- if there is such a body -- must take into account how to leverage interagency assets writ-large, AFRICOM has a remarkable niche opportunity. It can work to properly align its information operations and defense support to public diplomacy, thereby achieving synergy in interagency planning and operations at the nexus of strategic communication and security assistance.
How can it accomplish this? By crafting its message in meaningful, credible terms that will resonate with the local populace. This message must be consistent from the strategic to the tactical levels -- and cater to foreign audiences, not the more familiar military and domestic audiences frequently targeted by military Public Affairs Officers. Moreover, interagency partners must assist in shaping and disseminating the message. True coordination is required, not just deconfliction.
I would have hoped that USC would gone deeper than the surface issues and offered ideas on how the military should define its role, and what constitutes a "sophisticated plan for engaging in [defense support to] public diplomacy." Drawing on its knowledge of the art of public diplomacy, what lessons learned would help the command effectively cater its message to African audiences? What will it take to win the buy-in of the local populace? What are the unique tools the military brings to U.S. engagement in Africa -- and how can it best leverage its assets and capabilities?
While I do not pretend to have the answers (and I think I may have just proposed a Master's thesis project), I hope that future academic efforts will seek to empower policymakers by shedding light on these questions.
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